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RECOVERING TECH’S HUMANITY
Olivier Sylvain *
INTRODUCTION
Tim Wu’s essay, Will Artiﬁcial Intelligence Eat the Law?, posits that
automated decisionmaking systems may be taking the place of human
adjudication in social media content moderation. Conventional adjudicative processes, he explains, are too slow or clumsy to keep up with the
speed and scale of online information ﬂows. Their eclipse is imminent,
inevitable, and, he concludes, just as well.1
Wu’s essay does not really indulge in the romantic tropes about cyborg robot overlords, nor does he seem to hold a conceit about the
superiority of networked technologies. He does not promise, for example, anything similar to Mark Zuckerberg’s prophecy to Congress in
spring 2018 that artiﬁcial intelligence would soon cure Facebook of its
failings in content moderation.2 To the contrary, Wu here is sober about
the private administration of consumer information markets. After all, he
has been among the most articulate proponents of positive government
regulation in this area for almost two decades. The best we can do, Wu
argues, is create hybrid approaches that carefully integrate artiﬁcial
intelligence into the content moderation process.3
But in at least two important ways, Wu’s essay masks important challenges. First, by presuming the inevitability of automated decisionmaking
systems in online companies’ distribution of user-generated content and
data, Wu obscures the indispensable role that human managers at the
Big Tech companies have in developing and selecting their business designs, algorithms, and operational techniques for managing content
distribution.4 These companies deploy these resources to further their
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.
1. Tim Wu, Will Artiﬁcial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid SocialOrdering Systems, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2001, 2001–02 (2019) [hereinafter Wu, AI Eat the
Law].
2. Sarah Jeong, AI Is an Excuse for Facebook to Keep Messing Up, The Verge (Apr.
13, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/13/17235042/facebook-mark-zuckerbergai-artiﬁcial-intelligence-excuse-congress-hearings [https://perma.cc/6JB6-NJSG].
3. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2001–05.
4. By Big Tech companies, I refer to the dozen or so internet companies that dominate the networked information economy, but especially the “big ﬁve”: Facebook,
Alphabet (the owner of Google), Microsoft, Amazon, and Apple. For the purposes of this
Response, under this coinage, I also include Twitter, the social media company which,
after Facebook-owned entities, has the second-largest U.S. user base. See J. Clement, Most
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bottom-line interests in enlarging user engagement and dominating markets.5 In this way, social media content moderation is really only a tool for
achieving these companies’ central objectives. Wu’s essay also says close
to nothing about the various resources at work “behind the screens” that
support this commercial mission.6 While he recognizes that tens of thousands of human reviewers exist, for example, Wu downplays the companies’ role as managers of massive transnational production lines and employers of global labor forces. These workers and the proprietary
infrastructure with which they engage are invaluable to the distribution
of user-generated content and data.
Second, the claim that artiﬁcial intelligence is eclipsing law is premature, if not just a little misleading. There is nothing inevitable about the
private governance of online information ﬂows when we do not yet know
what law can do in this area. This is because courts have abjured their
constitutional authority to impose legal duties on online intermediaries’
administration of third-party content. The prevailing judicial doctrine
under section 230 of the Communications Act (as amended by the
Communications Decency Act)7 (section 230) allows courts to adjudicate
the question of intermediary liability for user-generated content when
the service at issue “contributes materially” to that content.8 This is to say
that the common law has not had a meaningful hand in shaping
intermediaries’ moderation of user-generated content because courts,
citing section 230, have foresworn the law’s application. Defamation,
fraud, and consumer protection law, for example, generally hold parties
legally responsible for disseminating unlawful information that originates
with third parties. But, under the prevailing section 230 doctrine, powerful companies like Facebook, Google, and Amazon do not have any legal
obligation to block or remove user-generated content that they have no
hand in “creat[ing]” or “develop[ing].”9 This is a standard that requires
Popular Social Networks in the United States in October 2018, Based on Active Monthly
Users (in Millions), Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/247597/global-traffic-to-leading-us-social-networking-sites/ [https://perma.cc/3Z7L-R5FX] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
5. See Sarah T. Roberts, Behind the Screen: Content Moderation in the Shadows of
Social Media 33–34 (2019) (discussing how “moderation and screening are crucial steps
that protect [internet companies’] corporate or platform brand . . . and contribute positively to maintaining an audience of users willing to upload and view content on their
sites”).
6. See id. at 34–35 (noting that while some content moderation is well suited for
“machine-automated ﬁltering,” the majority of such work requires human screeners that
are “called upon to employ an array of high-level cognitive functions and cultural
competencies to make decisions about their appropriateness for a site or platform”).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
8. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008); accord Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d
398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014) (describing Roommates.com as the “leading case” and applying the
“contributes materially” standard); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir.
2009) (applying the “contributes materially” standard).
9. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
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a substantial amount of involvement on the part of online companies to
justify liability. This is why it is not quite right to say, as Wu does here, that
we are witnessing the retreat of judicial decisionmaking in this setting.
There has never been the chance to see what even modest run-of-the-mill
judicial adjudication of content moderation decisions looks like since
Congress enacted section 230 over twenty years ago.
The view of online content moderation that Wu advances here is
pristine. Its exclusive focus on the ideal Platonic form of speech moderation resonates with the view that the internet can be an open and free
forum for civic republican deliberation.10 In this vein, he appeals to the
healthy constitutional skepticism in the United States about government
regulation of expressive conduct. One might associate his arguments
here with other luminaries who have proposed that we use communication technologies to create opportunities for discovery and progress.11
In any case, by presenting the issue of content moderation as a battle
between human adjudication and artiﬁcial intelligence, Wu’s essay here
fails to identify the industrial designs, regulatory arrangements, and human labor that have put the Big Tech companies in their position of control. It does not really engage the political economy and structural
arrangements that constitute and condition online content moderation.
I generally admire and subscribe to Wu’s various accounts and critiques of the networked information economy. He is a clear and eloquent
spokesperson for why positive procompetitive regulation and consumer
protection in communications markets are vital to the operation of
democracy. I, therefore, take his recent essay, and its relatively light touch
10. Compare Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of
American Community 245–46 (2000) (noting that “the rise of electronic communications
and entertainment,” especially television, coincided with “the national decline in social
connectedness” and civic disengagement among younger generations, although the evidence was not conclusive on causality), with Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 8–9, 167–70
(2001) (suggesting that while technology has given more power to consumers “to ﬁlter
what they see,” a “widely publicized deliberative domain[] on the Internet, ensuring
opportunities for discussion among people with diverse views,” would aid in maintaining a
“well-functioning system of free expression”). This approach also recalls far more theoretical treatments of “discourse ethics.” See generally Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996) (arguing
for a shift from communicative to strategic action in which parties to a dispute spend less
time debating validity claims and more time bargaining with threats and promises).
11. See Yochai Benkler, Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom 2 (2006) (describing a “new information environment” in which
users play “a more active role” and its potential to “serve as a platform for better democratic participation” and as a “mechanism to achieve improvements in human development everywhere”); Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 7–8 (1999)
(arguing that cyberspace as an open commons is key to checking government control and
advocating for open code); Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 10 (1983) (“The
onus is on us to determine whether free societies in the twenty-ﬁrst century will conduct
electronic communication under the conditions of freedom established for the domain of
print through centuries of struggle, or whether that great achievement will become lost in
a confusion about new technologies.”).
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on the Big Tech companies’ content moderation choices, as being addressed to whom he says it is addressed: the designers of these new hybrid processes. In contrast, this Response is addressed to policymakers
and reformers: the very people whom Wu has inspired with his other
writing. I offer this caveat to say that Wu and I may not actually have a
disagreement as a matter of substance. I will just use this generous opportunity to respond to his essay by identifying the reasons we cannot afford
to turn away from the lived political economy that shapes our networked
world.
I. CODIFYING CONTENT MODERATION
Communications law, Wu explains, has over the past two centuries
calibrated the “implicit competition” between “private and public
decisionmaking” and “norms and law.”12 In the United States, this balance has been informed in large part by the constitutional skepticism
about government regulation of information ﬂows.13 But the recent “arrival of software and artiﬁcial intelligence,” Wu explains, presents a “new”
challenge to the old public–private equilibrium in communications policy.14 Today, a handful of powerful private online platforms employ technologies to harvest and redistribute an extraordinary amount of consumer data.15 Common law adjudication, he concludes, cannot compete.
This was not always the case. For the ﬁrst decade or so after the commercial deployment of the internet (say, from 1995 to 2010), online
intermediaries were avowedly laissez faire about user-generated content.
Twitter, for example, presented itself as the “free speech wing of the free

12. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2006.
13. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 were unconstitutional because they lacked “the
precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of
speech”); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring “proof of actual malice for an award of punitive damages” in libel actions “brought by public officials against
critics of their official conduct”); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that speech that does not pose an “immediate
danger” or “hinder the success of the government arms” should be protected by free
speech rights and that such principles do not change during times of war).
14. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2007.
15. I here want to associate myself with Tarleton Gillespie’s very helpful way of writing
about platforms, now that the term has been divorced from its connotation among network engineers. See Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content
Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions that Shape Social Media 18–23 (2018).
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speech party.”16 Reddit purported to be the uncensored “front page of
the Internet,” warts and all.17
It was an exciting time for entrepreneurs and free speech advocates.
The most outspoken proponents of the new technology were bullish
about the ways in which the new information technology would disrupt
markets, governments, and all kinds of centralized power.18 They generally believed that the internet was a democratizing communication platform that would empower “users” to articulate themselves in ways that
incumbent telecommunications and media companies made impossible.19 This strong argument for unfettered networked communications
resonated with the deregulatory, free-market worldview among mainstream politicians in both parties and policy elites from the 1980s into
the mid-2000s. The language its proponents used could easily be associated, for example, with President Bill Clinton’s declaration in his 1996
State of the Union address that “the era of big government is over.”20
Writers and scholars often refer to John Perry Barlow’s powerful
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace—a magniﬁcent artifact of the
Davos neoliberal consensus of the day.21 Also signiﬁcant is Cyberspace and
16. Josh Halliday, Twitter’s Tony Wang: ‘We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free Speech
Party,’ Guardian (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/
twitter-tony-wang-free-speech [https://perma.cc/7GBW-RKX3].
17. John-Michael Bond, Understanding Reddit: A Beginner’s Guide to the Front
Page of the Internet, Daily Dot (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/what-isreddit/ [https://perma.cc/4NX2-9DPA]; Jake Widman & Will Nicol, What Is Reddit? A
Beginner’s Guide to the Front Page of the Internet, Dig. Trends (May 22, 2019),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/web/what-is-reddit/ [https://perma.cc/9WSE-ZBEL].
18. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 11, at 460–73 (concluding that the economic impact of massive changes in information technology attenuates the power of traditional
media institutions to mediate the public sphere, providing the opportunity to enhance
democracy and individual autonomy); Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of
Organizing Without Organizations 21–24 (2008) (“Now that there is competition to traditional institutional forms for getting things done, those institutions will continue to exist,
but their purchase on modern life will weaken as novel alternatives for group action
arise.”).
19. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 11, at 465 (“The emergence of a networked public
sphere is attenuating, or even solving, the most basic failings of the mass-mediated public
sphere. . . . The views of many more individuals and communities can be heard.”).
20. See Alison Mitchell, State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Offers Challenge
to Nation, Declaring, ‘Era of Big Government Is Over,’ N.Y. Times (Jan. 24, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/24/us/state-union-overview-clinton-offers-challengenation-declaring-era-big.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
21. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Elec.
Frontier Found. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://
perma.cc/2W4F-RXSA] (declaring that obsolete governments of the world will fail to control a new cyberspace civilization); see also Andy Greenberg, It’s Been 20 Years Since This Man
Declared Cyberspace Independence, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.wired.com/
2016/02/its-been-20-years-since-this-man-declared-cyberspace-independence/
[https://
perma.cc/3LE7-DZDJ] (reflecting on how Barlow’s early manifesto has aged and reporting that
“in recent years, Barlow admits his ideas have become less commonly used as a call to arms than
as a political punching bag”).
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the American Dream, authored by celebrated futurists and entrepreneurs
of the time, which claimed that the popular adoption of the internet
would make governments less relevant to public life.22 This, they wrote,
“is an inevitable implication of the transition from the centralized power
structures of the industrial age to the dispersed, decentralized institutions” of the networked world.23
During this period, courts, too, were generally pretty solicitous of
the new technology.24 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court remarked that
the internet was a “dynamic, multifaceted category of communication”
that exceeded anything humanity had experienced before.25 It, Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote for the Court, could transform “any person with
a phone line” into “a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it
could from any soapbox.”26
But things have evidently changed over the past decade or so. Above
all, as Wu powerfully explains in his recent book, only a handful of ﬁrms
control the ways in which the vast majority of information ﬂows to users
around the world.27 Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet (the owner of
Google), and Facebook sit atop the list of such companies based on market capitalization, along with Netﬂix and Chinese giants Alibaba and
Tencent.28 Facebook (the owner of Instagram and WhatsApp) generates
about half the market value of what Microsoft or Amazon do, but its
reach to users around the world is unrivaled.29 I have been using the
shorthand “Big Tech companies” to identify them.30 As a result, these
companies, as well as other popular moderators of user-generated content like Twitter and Reddit, have become the de facto arbiters of content
22. Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth & Alvin Toffler, Cyberspace and
the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age, 12 Info. Soc’y 295, 297
(1996).
23. Id. at 303.
24. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870, 874 (1997) (holding that provisions of
the 1996 Communications Decency Act restricting indecent content on the internet violated the First Amendment); Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its
plain language, § 230 [of the Communications Decency Act] creates a federal immunity to
any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service.”).
25. 521 U.S. at 870.
26. Id.
27. Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age 11 (2018)
[hereinafter Wu, Curse of Bigness].
28. J. Clement, Market Capitalization of the Biggest Internet Companies Worldwide as of
June 2019 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/marketvalue-of-the-largest-internet-companies-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/669Y-DJ6M] (last
visited Aug. 28, 2019).
29. J. Clement, Most Popular Social Networks Worldwide as of July 2019, Ranked by
Number of Active Users (in Millions), Statista (July 22, 2019), https://www.statista.com/
statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/ [https://perma.cc/64EBSBTQ] (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
30. See supra note 4.
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online. Society has come a long way from the democratic view of the
internet that prevailed in its nascent period.
And, as concentrated as the social media market has become, the
Big Tech companies have become more competitive about the size of the
audiences they reach. It is largely in service of this market pressure that
they have sought to create “healthy” environments for speech.31 To Wu,
there are three reasons that online platforms have become more attentive to content.32 First, activists of the past decade have raised general
awareness about the material harms that some kinds of expressive conduct exact on historically subordinated groups.33 Second, the major platforms have done more to limit or block the dissemination of “hateful
speech, foreign interference with elections, atrocity propaganda, and
hoaxes.”34 This second concern does not arise from wariness about harm
to marginalized groups but rather from the damage that users believe
social media distribution of “disinformation” has wrought on democracies across the globe.35
The third and ﬁnal reason for the current state of affairs, according
to Wu, has been the aggressive consolidation of the online “speech platform market” by Big Tech.36 It is little surprise that Wu asserts as much
here. He has been among the most articulate advocates of aggressive
antitrust regulation of communications markets. These powerful
intermediaries, he observes here, now decide in the ﬁrst instance which
kinds of content get distributed to subscribers.37 They do this at remarkable speeds and with increasing precision. Thus, as Wu puts it, “[W]hat
might have been thought to be important public decisions have either
been displaced or are beginning to be displaced by software, in whole or
in part,” by the sheer force of this enlarged technological capacity.38 In
this way, online platforms, especially those administered by the Big Tech
companies, have effectively supplanted the role of judges and legislatures

31. See Isaac Chotiner, The Underworld of Online Content Moderation, New Yorker
(July 5, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-underworld-of-online-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/34R7-YCMS] (interviewing Sarah T. Roberts, author
of Behind the Screen, supra note 5, who argues that the purpose of content moderation is
for brand management of social media platforms and not a genuine interest in healthier
online environments for speech).
32. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2010.
33. Id. at 2011–12.
34. Id. at 2010.
35. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media: How Facebook Disconnects Us and
Undermines Democracy 5 (2018) (“The dominance of Facebook on our screens, in our
lives, and over our minds has many dangerous aspects. . . . We’ve seen this in post-election
stories about the ﬂurry of ‘fake news,’ which is actually just one form of information
‘pollution.’”).
36. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2010–11.
37. Id. at 2013–18.
38. Id. at 2007.
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as policymakers.39 Today, the Big Tech companies are increasingly relying
on “proactive ﬁlters which prevent certain forms of content from being
posted at all.”40 They have employed screening systems for the detection
of the dissemination of child pornography, terrorist conspiracies, and the
unauthorized distribution of copyright-protected works.41 In Wu’s account, algorithms now govern online information ﬂows on social media.
II. HUMAN–TECH HYBRIDS
There can be little doubt that, today, automated decisionmaking systems are everywhere and deeply affecting. Some have been around for
decades in, say, air-ﬂight and traffic-light management.42 Others, like
algorithms for pretrial risk assessment and secondary school placement,
are of relatively recent vintage, even if not brand new.43 Today, most of us
rely on automated decisionmaking systems for our quotidian online existence—through recommendations, news feeds, stories, and advertisements.
The business models that sustain the most successful platforms rely
on such systems to solicit, harvest, collect, analyze, sort, and repurpose
massive amounts of consumer data.44 These same companies rely on similar automated decisionmaking systems to ﬁlter out and take down illegal,
unauthorized, or offensive material. Last year, Twitter publicly announced its initiative to promote “healthier” dialogue on its site by using
screening technologies to block or substantially reduce election med39. These developments, Wu observes, vindicate Lawrence Lessig’s prediction twenty
years ago that the internet would reveal the indispensable role that “code” (shorthand for
what we now colloquially refer to as “algorithms”) would have in regulating people’s
online conduct. See id.
40. Id. at 2016–17.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Clay McShane, The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals,
25 J. Urb. Hist. 379, 385 (1999) (describing the rapid adoption of automatic traffic lights
in American cities and London during the 1920s); Now—The Automatic Pilot, Popular
Sci. Monthly, Feb. 1930, at 22 (reporting on an early automatic ﬂight mechanism that kept
a plane ﬂying for three hours without human control on a 1930 ﬂight from Ohio to
Washington, D.C.).
43. See Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Proﬁle,
Police, and Punish the Poor 3 (2018) (“[W]e have ceded much of [our] decision-making
power to sophisticated machines. Automated eligibility systems, ranking algorithms, and
predictive risk models control which neighborhoods get policed, which families attain
needed resources, who is short-listed for employment, and who is investigated for fraud.”).
44. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control
Money and Information 3 (2015) (“Everything we do online is recorded . . . . Surveillance
cameras, data brokers, sensor networks, and ‘supercookies’ record how fast we drive, what
pills we take, what books we read, what websites we visit.”); Tim Wu, The Attention
Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads 211 (2016) [hereinafter Wu,
Attention Merchants] (“Years before Facebook or Google undertook a similar mission,
AOL’s business team also began coming up with ways to cash in on the ‘big data’ they had
collected: that is, the addresses, phone numbers, and credit card numbers of millions of
users.”).
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dling, harassment, user-bot activity, and general scams.45 Similarly, last
March, in response to lawsuits, Facebook announced that it would rely
on new ﬁlters to block the distribution of advertisements in housing,
employment, and credit markets that violate civil rights laws.46 This came
within months of the social media giant’s announcement that it would
use surveys to tweak its News Feed and promote more meaningful
engagement among users.47 And, just this summer, Facebook and its sister social media service, Instagram, announced that they would use new
screening tools to limit the advertisement and sale of alcohol and tobacco products, including e-cigarettes.48
As pervasive as automated screening technologies are, however, we
have not been completely overtaken by them just yet. Human resources
remain vitally important to when and how the major platforms publicly
distribute user-generated content because, as of now, automated screening technologies are just not good enough to make sense of the massive
amount of content that ﬂows through their servers. As information studies scholar Sarah Roberts puts it in her account of the political economy
of content moderation, “[T]he complex process of sorting user-uploaded
material into either the acceptable or the rejected pile is far beyond the
capabilities of software or algorithms alone.”49 This is why, in all of the
instances identiﬁed above, the companies also rely on people to correct
oversights, redress algorithmic biases, and clean up other mistakes the
screening technologies make.50
In fact, the Big Tech companies have relied on human resources to
moderate user-generated content since the mid-2000s. The largest platforms, for example, have long called on their own users to ﬂag or report

45. Louise Matsakis, What Would a ‘Healthy’ Twitter Even Look Like?, WIRED (Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/what-would-healthy-twitter-look-like/ [https://perma.cc/
PS6E-3R4P].
46. Katie Paul, Facebook Agrees to Advertising Overhaul to Settle U.S.
Discrimination Suits, Reuters (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/usfacebook-advertisers/facebook-agrees-to-advertising-overhaul-to-settle-u-s-discriminationsuits-idUSKCN1R02CO [https://perma.cc/T2Q2-PCKU].
47. Ramya Sethuraman, Jordi Vallmitjana & Jon Levin, Using Surveys to Make News
Feeds More Personal, Facebook Newsroom (May 16, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/
news/2019/05/more-personalized-experiences/ [https://perma.cc/ZA6L-679H].
48. David Cohen, People Can No Longer Sell or Exchange Alcohol and Tobacco
Products on Facebook and Instagram, Adweek (July 24, 2019), https://www.adweek.com/
digital/people-can-no-longer-sell-or-exchange-alcohol-and-tobacco-products-on-facebook-andinstagram/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
49. Roberts, supra note 5, at 34.
50. Arman Azad, First on CNN: Facebook and Instagram to Restrict Content Related to
Alcohol, Tobacco and e-Cigarettes, CNN (July 24, 2019), https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/
07/24/health/facebook-instagram-alcohol-tobacco-bn/index.html [https://perma.cc/3U73W5HM] (explaining that, in order to implement its new alcohol and tobacco rule,
Facebook will “use a combination of technology, human review and reports from our
community to ﬁnd and remove any content that violates these policies”).
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content that violates content guidelines.51 The companies then employ vast
global workforces to check on this flagged content.52 Today, Facebook and
Google each employ tens of thousands of salaried workers and
contractors around the world who review user-reported material.53
Depending on the complexity or difficulty of knowing whether any given
content should be blocked (think of the live stream of the Christchurch
massacre or the doctored video clips of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives Nancy Pelosi), these reviewers escalate evaluation
through internal appellate processes that, in the hardest cases, might
even culminate in a ﬁnal decision at the highest levels of the company.54
Human review is essential today because it confers a degree of legitimacy on the platforms’ moderation choices. For Wu, Facebook’s plans
for an Oversight Board help to illustrate the point. Late last year, months
after Facebook head Mark Zuckerberg hinted at it, the social media giant
announced its plans for a transnational “Supreme Court” of sorts to rule
on whether any especially controversial user-generated content should be
taken down.55 Soon after, it released a draft charter and framework for
the plan and sought out feedback from policymakers, activists, and users
around the world.56 The company published the ﬁnal charter in
September of this year.57 While the ﬁne details of its implementation remain uncertain, Facebook concluded that the Board is to be composed
of forty independent experts from around the world.58 Each member will
serve three-year terms and may serve a total of three terms if reappointed.59 The Board will develop its procedures.60 It will publish deci51. See, e.g., How to Report Things on Facebook, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/
help/181495968648557 [https://perma.cc/744Y-D3FM] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019); Report
Abusive Behavior, Twitter, https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/report-abusivebehavior [https://perma.cc/7GUJ-ZZDD] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
52. Gillespie, supra note 15, at 117–24.
53. Roberts, supra note 5, at 1–2.
54. See Kate Klonick, Inside the Team at Facebook that Dealt with the Christchurch
Shooting, New Yorker (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/insidethe-team-at-facebook-that-dealt-with-the-christchurch-shooting [https://perma.cc/EW6LKZVV].
55. The idea has generally been attributed to Harvard Law professor Noah Feldman. See
Mark Sullivan, Exclusive: The Harvard Professor Behind Facebook’s Oversight Board Defends
Its Role, Fast Company (July 8, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90373102/exclusive-theharvard-professor-behind-facebooks-oversight-board-defends-its-role [https://perma.cc/8UVHRPJ6].
56. The company published a summary of the feedback received on the draft charter
after conducting workshops and roundtables around the world during the first half of 2019. See
Brent Harris, Global Feedback and Input on the Facebook Oversight Board for Content
Decisions, Facebook Newsroom (June 27, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/06/
global-feedback-on-oversight-board/ [https://perma.cc/VQL9-CNBM].
57. Facebook, Oversight Board Charter (2019), https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.
com/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PHQ-HM34].
58. Id. art. I, §§ 1–2.
59. Id. art. I, § 3.
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sions on content, which must be supported by “plain language” explanations.61 Over time, these decisions would ostensibly comprise a body of
something like “law” for future Board decisionmaking.
Observers have highlighted a variety of potential problems with the
Board’s framework. Some are administrative: As in, how quickly will the
Board be able to adjudicate especially inﬂammatory content like the
livestream of the Christchurch massacre or the doctored Pelosi videos?62
Waiting just minutes after the public release of such content is all a person with just a few followers or connections needs to (innocently,
mischievously, or malevolently) disseminate especially inﬂammatory content.63 Relatedly, will the Board have the capacity to redress different controversies that simultaneously arise in different parts of the world? Other
questions are related, but more substantive: As in, how could a fortymember board be capable of authoritatively resolving regionally or
culturally idiosyncratic controversies around the world?64
These are altogether different from the existential question of what
role Facebook (or any online platform) will in fact have in the Board’s
governance.65 According to the Charter, the company will contract for
the Board’s services,66 select the Board’s co-chairs,67 and establish an
irrevocable trust for the compensation of its members and the provision
of other ﬁnancial support.68 The Charter provides that Facebook will be
bound by the Board’s decisions in individual cases, but the company will

60. Id. art. II, § 1.
61. Id. art. III, §§ 4, 6.
62. See, e.g., Melanie Ehrenkranz, Facebook Shares More Details About the
Content Oversight Board You’ll Be Getting Pissed Off About in the Future, Gizmodo
( Jan. 28, 2019), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-shares-more-details-about-the-contentoversigh-1832134512 [https://perma.cc/8UBD-AL2Y] (expressing concern that the Board
will not be able to tackle the pressing day-to-day content monitoring issues on Facebook).
63. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 54 (“While obvious bad actors were pushing the
[Christchurch shooting] video on the site to spread extremist content or to thumb their
noses at authority, many more posted it to condemn the attacks, to express sympathy for
the victims, or because of the video’s newsworthiness.”).
64. See, e.g., Max Read, Facebook Is Going to Have a Supreme Court. Will It Work?, N.Y.
Mag.: Intelligencer (Jan. 30, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/facebooks-newoversight-board-is-a-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/M2KX-J26Q] (criticizing the proposed board as being “ill-equipped” to address complex issues like Facebook’s role in ethnic
cleansing in Myanmar).
65. See generally Glob. Partners Dig., A Rights-Respecting Model of Online Content
Regulation by Platforms (2018), https://www.gp-digital.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Arights-respecting-model-of-online-content-regulation-by-platforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF47L5UB] (“[T]here is a middle ground between the current purely self-regulatory approach and
the development of national-level regulatory or oversight mechanisms.”).
66. Facebook, supra note 57, at art. V, § 1.
67. Id. art. I, § 8.
68. Id. art. V, § 1–2.
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not be bound by the Board’s advisory opinions about Facebook’s content
policy.69
We do not yet know, of course, how all of this will actually play out,
but for Wu, the case of the Oversight Board illustrates the emergent “hybrid” approach to online content moderation; Facebook relies on automated screening technologies, user reports, and an elaborate process for
human adjudication inside (and potentially outside) of the company to
decide which user-generated content to distribute.70 This kind of overt
human involvement, he explains, engenders “deeper acceptance and
greater public satisfaction.”71 Perhaps this is because algorithmic
decisionmaking systems typically do not explain their ﬁnal decisions in
language that most people understand.72 Or perhaps general ambivalence about automated systems arises from artiﬁcial intelligence’s inability (at least for now) to read social cues that, in real time among real people, elicit trust.73 In any event, Wu observes, human oversight plainly pre-

69. Id. art. IV.
70. See Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2018–20.
71. Id. at 2002–03. One might associate this sentiment with the notion of trust. See
generally Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age
(2018) (exploring how people are more likely to share information on social media in
“contexts of trust”).
72. See Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2021–22 (“Software can often explain
how it reached a decision, but not why. That may be ﬁne for a thermostat, but is a
limitation for a system that is supposed both to satisfy those subjected to it and to prompt
acceptance of an adverse ruling.”). Wu’s focus here on “procedural fairness,” id. at 2–5,
recalls what Professor Danielle Citron has called “technological due process.” See Danielle
Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1258 (2008); see also
Danielle Keats Citron, Big Data Should Be Regulated by ‘Technological Due Process,’ N.Y.
Times: Room for Debate (July 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/
08/06/is-big-data-spreading-inequality/big-data-should-be-regulated-by-technological-dueprocess [https://perma.cc/67PR-646L] (arguing for greater transparency into automated
decisionmaking). For Citron, technological due process requires democratic oversight of
algorithmic decisionmaking, including transparency and routine auditing by government
agencies. See id. She argues, among other things, that such oversight would engender
procedural regularity. See id.
73. Professors Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger speculate about the variety of
sociological and psychological hurdles that stand in the way of accepting the wide deployment of “techno-social systems,” including the difficulty for laypeople to understand how
the technologies work. There are also general worries about the “tipping point” after
which automated decisionmaking systems effectively colonize and substantially diminish
human agency and freedom. See Brett Frischmann & Evan Selinger, Re-Engineering
Humanity 10–11 (2018). Anyway, facial recognition technology is years away from helping
on that front. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect
Tool for Oppression, Medium (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognitionis-the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66
[https://perma.cc/8TH6-33UG].
Local
governments have also been banning its use. See, e.g., J.E.F., Why San Francisco
Banned the Use of Facial-Recognition Technology, Economist (May 16, 2019), https://www.
economist.com/democracy-in-america/2019/05/16/why-san-francisco-banned-the-use-of-facialrecognition-technology [https://perma.cc/9ZFS-RQ2F]; Sara Ravani, Oakland Bans Use of
Facial Recognition Technology, Citing Bias Concerns, S.F. Chron. (July 17, 2019),
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sents the distinctive advantage of “highly trained human judgment,” a
feature that is sometimes at odds with or just orthogonal to the decisions
that automated systems make in reliance on ex ante rules.74 This kind of
reasonable common sense puts the relative equities in any given case into
perspective in ways that hard-and-fast rules sometimes do not get right,
but that good human judgment does.
III. CONTENT MODERATION IS INDUSTRIAL DESIGN
Wu’s account here is useful, but it signiﬁcantly downplays the scope
and depth of human involvement in the day-to-day political economy of
content moderation at the Big Tech platforms. His essay is principally
concerned with explaining the ways in which automated decisionmaking
systems (ought to) interact with human judgment. Even on these terms,
however, the current law does not create incentives that might inﬂuence
the Big Tech’s industrial designs. Wu asks here: “Will Artiﬁcial
Intelligence Eat the Law?” The inquiry is an alluring one for our times.
But it obscures who and what is actually at work.
Wu has been among the most effective chroniclers of the networked
information economy for almost two decades.75 He and others, including
Professors Siva Vaidhyanathan and Frank Pasquale, for example, have
written compellingly about the ways in which the Big Tech companies are
driven chieﬂy by a business model that relies on harvesting as much consumer data as possible and using that data to optimize consumer engagement.76 They do this in the name of increasing shareholder value.77
This remains an important account. So, it is worth stating here
plainly what Wu’s essay does not: The ambition to foster “healthy” online
engagement, while more than an afterthought, is hardly the Big Tech
companies’ main priority. These companies are not (and do not see
themselves as) chieﬂy in the business of calibrating the right balance between human moderators and screening algorithms. Rather, their aim is
to hold and expand their dominion over networked information ﬂows.
They protect this position by, among other things, developing products
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Oakland-bans-use-of-facial-recognition14101253.php [https://perma.cc/3D6Q-SYVW].
74. Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2005–06.
75. Wu, Attention Merchants, supra note 44; Wu, Curse of Bigness, supra note 27; Tim
Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (2011) [hereinafter Wu,
Master Switch]. I have engaged with it directly with great appreciation and admiration for as
long as I have been writing about information law and policy. Some of my efforts have been
more successful than others. E.g., Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 Hastings L.J. 443
(2016); Olivier Sylvain, Wireless Localism: Beyond the Shroud of Objectivity in Federal
Spectrum Administration, 20 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 121 (2013).
76. See Pasquale, supra note 44, at 20; Vaidhyanathan, supra note 35, at 83–84; Wu,
Attention Merchants, supra note 44, at 325.
77. See Pasquale, supra note 44, at 65–66 (explaining that shareholder demand
drives technology companies like Google to use data as a revenue source).
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that users cannot resist or acquiring rivals’ emergent services and products to avoid any contraction of their market share.78 They also routinely
rely on intellectual property law (such as patent and trade secrets laws),
worker contracts (such as nondisclosure and noncompete agreements),
and a wide assortment of other legal tools to preserve control over their
internal decisionmaking processes.79 And, besides all of this, they also
appeal to the variety of governments and jurisdictions around the world
where their users reside, including authoritarian regimes with no compunction about imposing restrictions on political speech.80 Artiﬁcial
intelligence surely matters for content moderation. But, in light of all
else that is at work, it is more likely an incident of these companies’ overt
industrial designs on the control and consolidation of the distribution of
user information.
The idea that private corporations in the United States have incentives for proﬁt and control is not news. The political economy of media
and communications markets over the past two centuries has generally
turned on companies’ power to provide advertisers access to audiences.81
As Wu himself has observed elsewhere, since at least the penny press, media companies have traded on their gatekeeper position for advertisers
who want to reach users.82 One difference today is that online platforms
have at their disposal powerful tools that track and predict each consumer’s idiosyncratic behavior and preferences. They do this with much
more precision and at greater scale than ever before. What is more, the
platforms, especially the Big Tech companies, exploit the user data that
they harvest to develop new services and products that keep their users
engaged.83 Online platforms’ capacity for large-scale automated “microtargeting” paired with their ability to keep consumers’ attention has triggered a paradigmatic shift in the media and communications ecosystem.
Advertisers have ﬂocked to online platforms (really, affiliate-advertising
networks that track consumers’ behavior across sites on the web) at the
expense of traditional brick-and-mortar media companies whose capacity
to reach audiences is more speculative and far less ﬁne-tuned.84

78. See Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710, 752–55
(2017) (describing Amazon’s business model, which relies on the indispensability of its
product and its central role in the infrastructure of the internet economy).
79. Pasquale, supra note 44, at 3, 193.
80. Adrian Shahbaz, Freedom House, Freedom on the Net: The Rise of Digital
Authoritarianism 11–15 (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_
2018_Final%20Booklet_11_1_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/88RG-47PT].
81. See Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History of American
Newspapers 93–94 (1978) (“Newspapers became brokers of their own columns, selling
their space and the readership it represented to advertisers.”).
82. Wu, Attention Merchants, supra note 44, at 12.
83. Id. at 53–54.
84. Id. at 264.
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This is why it is not exactly right to suggest, as Wu does in his essay,
that algorithms are suppressing human adjudication.85 Automated screening technologies know nothing about it, as they are what Lewis Mumford
a century ago called the mere “technics” that ﬁrm managers have chosen
to deploy to enlarge their commercial reach and capacity to administer
online user experiences.86 In this vein, policymakers ought to be eyeing,
above all, the ways in which the Big Tech companies manipulate these
tools to exploit their powerful market position between users and
advertisers. Artiﬁcial intelligence and automated decisionmaking are not
to blame. To be sure, those are important aspects of the current state of
affairs. But the focus of policymakers and regulators should be on the Big
Tech companies’ pecuniary objectives and the designs that they have
chosen to use in service of those aims.
These (very human) incentives to control and consolidate information ﬂows explain only a part of the political economy of social media
content distribution. The vast infrastructure of hardware and labor “behind the screen” are the indispensable resources on which these companies’ executives organize the content review process. They are assets that
must be managed, and they represent costs that must be offset. It may be
that the Big Tech companies have not been as deliberate as Frederick
Taylor and other proponents of “scientiﬁc management” a century ago
were about every detail in the production process.87 But the sequence of
human resources that platforms devote to user-generated content review
at the Big Tech companies—from automated screening, to users who ﬂag
objectionable content, to off-site content moderation contractors and
review boards, to in-house reviewers—resembles a factory-ﬂoor production line, albeit a transnational and virtual one.88 The ways in which the
Big Tech companies organize all of these resources is central to understanding their distribution of user-generated content.
For the past several years, a handful of intrepid scholars and journalists have reported on the industrial design of the content review process
at the Big Tech companies.89 The pace and quantity of critical writing on
85. See Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2013–18.
86. See Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization 426–27 (1934) (“All [technic]
mechanisms are dependent upon human aims and desires.”).
87. See Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientiﬁc Management 7 (1911)
(describing the need for “systematic management” to root out inefficiency in the production process).
88. See e.g., Community Standards, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/ [https://perma.cc/BT5C-3N3F] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) (providing a
thorough look at Facebook’s user-generated content review process).
89. See, e.g., Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the Internet,
The Verge (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internetmoderator-history-youtube-facebook-reddit-censorship-free-speech [https://perma.cc/LXA9UKCG]; Adrian Chen, The Laborers Who Keep Dick Pics and Beheadings out of Your
Facebook Feed, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/contentmoderation/ [https://perma.cc/8NH5-AZ7N].
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this once-overlooked area have increased substantially over the past few
months, signaling an important shift in the popular mind about the
online platforms.90 This, by the way, is not an emergent ﬁeld of inquiry
that is limited to social media content moderation. Kate Crawford and
Vladan Joler, for example, have mapped the resources and industrial processes that power Amazon’s online retail business.91 In Anatomy of an AI
System, which is part narrative and part graphic visualization, Crawford
and Joler vividly describe the full range of infrastructures and processes
that deliver products to users: from the Echo unit that sits in a living
room, to the mines from which companies extract the rare earth elements of which ﬁber optic cables and satellites are built, to the working
conditions at Amazon’s distribution centers.92
More pertinently, in her new book Behind the Screen, Sarah Roberts
provides perhaps the most comprehensive account of “industrial-scale”
organized and professional content moderation.93 Key to her account is
the human labor involved.94 And this is vitally important in light of Wu’s
thesis. This workforce, she explains, brings “an array of high-level cognitive functions and cultural competencies” that continues to elude automated decisionmaking systems.95 But, Roberts continues, this speciﬁc
kind of “knowledge work” is difficult to the point of being traumatizing.96
After all, these are the people who watch, categorize, take down, and
block the worst kinds of content: graphic abuse of children, acts of selfharm, gory war zone footage.97 This is unequivocally ugly and isolating,
she explains.98 But someone has to do it if the internet is to be inviting
for the vast majority of users.
Meanwhile, the managers at the Big Tech companies responsible for
managing this workforce are making “a business decision on the part of

90. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin, Jeanne Whalen & Regine Cabato, Content
Moderators at YouTube, Facebook and Twitter See the Worst of the Web—And Suffer Silently,
Wash. Post (July 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/25/socialmedia-companies-are-outsourcing-their-dirty-work-philippines-generation-workers-is-payingprice/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor, The Verge
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebookcontent-moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona [https://perma.cc/35QELXSW].
91. Kate Crawford & Vladan Joler, Anatomy of an AI System, Anatomy of an AI Sys.
(Sept. 8, 2018), https://anatomyof.ai/ [https://perma.cc/R24M-SSWP].
92. Id.
93. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 1–2.
94. See id. at 34–35 (“[T]he vast majority of social media content uploaded by its
users requires human intervention for it to be appropriately screened . . . .”).
95. Id. at 34–35.
96. Id. at 104–05.
97. Id. at 105.
98. See id. at 111–23 (outlining the psychological effects of continual exposure to
traumatic videos on commercial content moderators).
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the social media companies themselves.”99 The inclusion of human
reviewers has never been, she explains, “a foregone conclusion based on
technological necessity or other factors.”100 To the extent the workers
committed to this are in-house, for example, executives at these companies will presumably consider resiliency trainings, in addition to
infrastructures that support and guide workers who click through so
much graphic content.101 The same kind of calculus guides managerial
decisions about how many reviewers should be outside contractors, as
opposed to in-house employees. Indeed, for managers of the content
moderation process at the Big Tech companies, the choice to consign
this difficult work to outside contractors is suggestive.102 First, as Roberts
explains, by entering into short-term itinerant contracts with these workers, the companies have tacitly acknowledged that any given person cannot stay in the position for more than a couple years because of the
trauma it causes;103 to include such workers within the salaried conﬁnes
of the Big Tech ﬁrms would arguably alter those ﬁrms’ obligations to
these workers.104 Second, the cost of labor for such work is simply
cheaper in other parts of the world, largely because the host countries,
mainly in East Asia, create incentives for transnational ﬁrms to locate
their workers in industrial zones.105 At these sites, the companies enjoy
“tax exemptions and other sweetheart economic terms that may also include relaxed labor laws or other incentives that leave workers and other
citizens at a deﬁcit.”106
Wu’s essay needn’t delve into this detail. Again, his essay’s aim is to
puzzle through whether and how human adjudication and artiﬁcial
intelligence can interact.107 Thus, a reader might think that my point
here about industrial designs is fussier or more rhetorical than illuminative, particularly since Wu has elsewhere written extensively about the
political economy of information markets.108 Or perhaps my intervention
here just reﬂects a dispute over emphasis rather than substance.
I insist that it does not. Wu’s essay makes the case that conventional
forms of human decisionmaking are sometimes not as effective or
99. Id. at 35.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 209–10 (describing early steps being taken by tech companies to support employee wellness).
102. See id. at 123.
103. See id. at 123–25 (“Assuredly, burnout due to the constant viewing of troubling
content was a factor among the commercial content moderation workers at MegaTech and
elsewhere.”).
104. Id. at 125–37 (outlining the ways in which a Big Tech ﬁrm could arguably use
employees’ contractor status to “distanc[e] itself from the results of the job on the
employees”).
105. Id. at 62.
106. Id.
107. See Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2002–05.
108. See, e.g., Wu, Master Switch, supra note 75, at 5–7, 10–12.
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responsive as platforms’ automated screening techniques.109 But there is
nothing inevitable or necessary about artiﬁcial intelligence’s place in the
decisions that platforms make. Nor, to be plain, do such technologies
matter in fact as much as he avers here. What matters most today are
deeply human concerns: the political economy, geography, incentives,
regulatory arrangements, and industrial designs that guide platforms’
decisions about when and how to employ different screening techniques.
To put the point a little more starkly: Screening technologies do not
make content distribution decisions. As rule-bound as they are, they do
not eat anything they are told to leave alone. The question of how to
structure online content moderation review processes is an industrial
design question, not one for algorithms.
IV. BIG TECH’S DESIGNS UNFETTERED BY LAW
Focusing on the relative efficacy of artiﬁcial intelligence in content
moderation (at the expense of human adjudication) is mistaken for another important reason: It clouds extant obstacles to assigning legal responsibility to online intermediaries. The rise of automated decisionmaking is not the main reason judicial adjudication has had little to no hand
in regulating Big Tech’s publication and distribution of information.
Section 230 doctrine is the reason that the courts have read the provision
as blocking them from doing so.
In 1996, Congress sought to ensure that “interactive computer services” were “unfettered” by any legal obligation to publish user-generated content with section 230.110 The courts have read this charge to
effectively immunize online platforms from liability for distributing any
material to which they do not “materially contribute.”111 So, if there is
anything that has eaten the law in this area, it is section 230 doctrine—a
creation of legislators and judges, not artiﬁcial intelligence.112

109. See Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2021.
110. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012). See generally Jeff Kosseff, The Twenty-Six Words
that Created the Internet 9–76 (2019) (providing an illuminating account of the statute’s
enactment).
111. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–68
(9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing between “passive conduits” and “co-developers” in
determining liability for online websites).
112. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401, 402 (2017)
(“Courts applying § 230’s immunity provision have dismissed efforts to hold [online platforms] responsible for defamatory posts that have damaged lives and careers.”); Olivier
Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 Conn. L. Rev. 203, 215 (2018) [hereinafter Sylvain,
Design Duties] (arguing that “online intermediary designs implicate online services and
applications far more than courts have recognized to this point”); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
The Monsanto Lecture: Online Defamation, Legal Concepts, and the Good Samaritan, 51
Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2018) (arguing that the current section 230 doctrine “is alien from
what Congress intended”).
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Wu devotes one paragraph of his essay to section 230.113 He could be
forgiven for this relative inattention. The debate that the statute’s mere
mention generates in some circles these days is often hyperbolic and
sometimes dispiriting and vitriolic—it tends to emit more heat than light.
The debate in vogue in Washington, D.C., particularly among right-wing
conservatives, is that section 230 requires political neutrality or that it
immunizes social media companies from discriminating against conservative viewpoints.114 Neither is a correct reading of the statute or the
doctrine.115 But, as challenging as discussion about the topic may often
be, the doctrine is essential to understanding the basic contours of the
current state of affairs. No matter one’s view of it, section 230 doctrine
should be part of any serious consideration of whether judicial adjudication in this area is receding.
It is not obvious here whether Wu’s silence on current section 230
doctrine reﬂects his support for or indifference about it. Anyway, his relative inattention to the immunity here is glaring in light of the essay’s
premise about human adjudication. If I were asked to provide a revision
to Wu’s essay title (and no one has asked me, of course), it would be to
offer a qualiﬁcation: AI is eating the law, and “Congress and jurists have
let it.”
Section 230’s stated purpose is “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”116
Congress set out the workings of the statute in section 230(c). First, under section 230(c)(1), Congress sought to ensure that courts would not
“treat[]” online intermediaries as “publishers or speakers” of their users’
content.117 This language was meant to head off judicial application of
defamation law to online platforms.118 Under traditional defamation
principles, publishers are as liable for disseminating unlawful speech as
the original speaker.119 Section 230 removes that duty for “interactive
computer services” on the theory that the massive amounts of content
that ﬂowed through online services (back then, think electronic bulletin
boards, online chatrooms, and newsgroups) are impossible to monitor
without substantially curtailing the distribution of lawful user-generated
content—the application of defamation law would have the effect of
113. See Wu, AI Eat the Law, supra note 1, at 2009.
114. See Sarah Jeong, Politicians Want to Change the Internet’s Most Important Law. They
Should Read It First., N.Y. Times (July 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/
opinion/section-230-political-neutrality.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
115. Id.
116. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012).
117. Id. § 230(c)(1).
118. See Zeran v. AOL, 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that section 230
was intended to shield computer service providers from publisher liability).
119. See id. at 331 (outlining “the strict liability standard normally applied to original
publishers of defamatory statements”).
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“chilling” lawful online speech.120 That is why, the courts have explained,
under the statute, an intermediary may only be held liable if it somehow
“creat[es] or develop[s]” the offending content.121
Congress signaled the second notable feature of the statute in the
header of section 230(c): “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and
Screening of Offensive Material.”122 Here, legislators created a safe harbor that was to shield from liability “interactive computer services” that
voluntarily take good faith efforts to block or take down objectionable
content.123 One straightforward reading of the statute would presume
that this subsection, section 230(c)(2), is actually the operative provision,
and that section 230(c)(1), described above, only removes the presumption that publishing torts apply as usual to online intermediaries.124 But
the courts have since read section 230 so broadly as to effectively write
the Good Samaritan safe harbor at section 230(c)(2) out of the statute.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. AOL in 1997
was the ﬁrst federal appellate court to apply the provision.125 There, the
panel concluded that the statute protected AOL from being held liable
for its repeated distribution of an anonymous person’s defamatory posts
about the plaintiff.126 In an opinion that would set the tone for the doctrine for the next two decades, Judge Harvey Wilkinson held that, under
section 230, America Online had no obligation to block or take down the
unlawful content, even when, acting as a distributor, it had knowledge
that the inﬂammatory material at issue was defamatory.127

120. Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
Notre Dame L. Rev. 293, 303–04 (2011) (“[T]he chilling effects on intermediaries are
even greater [than for publishers], and the law ought to account for that difference.”).
121. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). See generally Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (outlining the distinction between a nonliable “service provider” that “passively displays content that is created entirely by third parties” and a liable
“content provider” that creates content itself); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (ﬁnding no liability for Craigslist
in discriminatory postings on the site, as the service did not “cause” or “induce” such
postings); Zeran, 129 F.3d 327 (holding section 230 to preclude liability on the part of the
online service provider for the comments made by third-party participants); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[Congress] made the legislative judgment to
effectively immunize providers of interactive computer services . . . with respect to material
disseminated by them but created by others.”).
122. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
123. Id. § 230(c)(2).
124. See Sylvain, Design Duties, supra note 112, at 258 n.298 (discussing Doe v. GTE
Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003)).
125. 129 F.3d 327; see also Davis R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet,
61 Alb. L. Rev. 147, 151 (1997) (“In Zeran, the ﬁrst reported case to consider the scope of
the immunity conferred by § 230, the court held that § 230 also confers upon interactive
computer services immunity from liability as distributors.”).
126. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332–33.
127. Id. at 333.
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The Zeran opinion and those that have followed have set out an
exceptional regulatory arrangement. Courts have applied Zeran to a
variety of cases involving online material, reaching conclusions that they
would never reach in cases involving broadcasters, newspapers, or other
traditional media. For example, they have immunized an openly misogynistic blog that encourages visitors to post and comment on defamatory and otherwise degrading material about speciﬁc young women.128
They have immunized an online dating service that did nothing to forbid
a user from creating false and lurid proﬁles of an ex-lover, even after the
victim, a nonuser, had sent repeated requests to have the site take the
material down.129 Courts also have applied the immunity well outside of
the defamation setting, granting it, for example, to a classiﬁeds page that
knowingly facilitated sex trafficking130 and an online marketplace that is
an overt platform for the purchase and sale of unregistered automatic
riﬂes on its site.131
We might assume that these “interactive computer services” are exactly what the drafters of the immunity meant to shield. The premise of
the broad protection, after all, was to allow online intermediaries to be
“unfettered” conduits for the public distribution of user-generated content—that consumers would be the best adjudicators of the content they
want.132 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the federal courts forged
the doctrine’s contours, it seemed sensible to insulate the new technology from legal regulation if doing so would ensure that the usergenerated content could ﬂow freely.133
Today, however, intermediaries are far more than simple publishers
or distributors of third-party content. And users appear to have few constraints on what they are willing to post or consume. Online platforms
have been able to experiment with all kinds of business designs that elicit
the worst sorts of expressive conduct and transactions.134 They can do
this, in spite of the Good Samaritan language in the statute, without ever
even pretending a “good faith” interest in moderating such conduct and
transactions.135 Today, as I explain in Part III, they carefully engineer and
curate our online experiences; they elicit, collect, harvest, sort, analyze,
and repurpose consumer data in service of their own business objectives
and the prerogatives of the advertisers who have come to rely on them.136
128. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 765 F.3d 398, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2014).
129. See Herrick v. Grindr, 756 F. App’x 586, 588–89, 591 (2d Cir. 2019).
130. See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 16–17, 24 (1st Cir. 2016).
131. See Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 714–15, 727 (Wis. 2019).
132. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012).
133. See Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
134. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text.
135. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
136. Sylvain, Design Duties, supra note 112, at 205–07 (describing how online platforms have become more than neutral conduits for information and now are commercial
enterprises proﬁting from users’ conduct and information).
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This political economy of networked information ﬂows looks nothing
like the internet of twenty years ago. And now that just half a dozen or so
companies administer most of our online activity, we are a far cry from
the days of a user-powered internet populated by a diversity of online
forums, news groups, and electronic bulletin boards.
It is also not at all clear that a laissez-faire approach to online platform moderation was ever a good idea to begin with. The logic for open
and robust debate does not require that every possible thought ﬁnd
expression.137 The problem with the blanket immunity is that, pursuant
to section 230 immunity, platforms need not mind laws that forbid harmful expressive conduct, even as they are the best situated to do so.138
Never mind the generic safety of online platforms for all users. An unregulated speech environment generally has devastating effects on the people and groups for whom legal protections exist. There are, of course,
the people for whom judicial recourse is effectively a dead letter as a general matter under the current doctrine.139 But, to the extent public laws
exist to remedy extant information asymmetries, the people whom such
laws are supposed to protect—those who are likeliest to be harmed because of inequality and other background sociopolitical and economic
structures—become more exposed to harm if intermediaries presume no
native legal or ethical duty to mind third-party content.140 Online, these
harms metastasize rapidly.141 Individual retail consumers are more vulner137. See Raymond Geuss, A Republic of Discussion: Habermas at Ninety, Point,
https://thepointmag.com/2019/politics/republic-of-discussion-habermas-at-ninety [https://
perma.cc/8UCK-KY6Y] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) (discussing philosophical arguments
for why completely unfettered free speech may not be ideal).
138. See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 986, 987–88 (2008) (“[I]ntermediary liability for
users’ speech is largely uncoupled from intermediary control over such speech:
intermediaries possess power over individual speakers, but they have little or no
corresponding responsibility to individuals for the use or abuse of that power.”). See
generally Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970)
(suggesting that a fault system of accident law may be efficiently tailored to directly assign
costs to the least-cost avoiders).
139. Zipursky, supra note 112, at 5–6, 14 (discussing how courts’ interpretation of
section 230 has made it difficult to hold internet service providers liable for promulgating
defamatory content posted by a third party).
140. Cf. Rohit Chopra, Comm’r, FTC Tech Platforms, Content Creators, and
Immunity, Prepared Remarks at the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
Annual Spring Meeting (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1510713/chopra_-_aba_spring_meeting_3-28-19_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HZQ8-7UHS] (“The deployment of online behavioral advertising distorts the incentives of
technology companies that might ordinarily be seen as neutral intermediaries.”).
141. Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, Knight First Amendment
Inst. (Apr. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data
[https://perma.cc/PM6K-PJ96] [hereinafter Discriminatory Designs] (“The harm that
these users experience is made worse by the way in which illicit or inﬂammatory content,
once distributed, can spread across the internet at a speed and scale that is hard, if not
impossible, to control.”).
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able to deceptive advertisements.142 Voters are misinformed about candidates.143 Investors are likelier to get duped into purchasing stocks.144
Members of historically subordinated groups—women, people of color,
disabled people, members of the LGBTQ community—are more vulnerable to harassment and discrimination.145 The ways in which the Big Tech
companies design their services, if unchecked, could compound these
conditions of inequality.146
These critics of section 230 doctrine do not propose, as some skeptics have supposed,147 that platforms favor certain kinds of speech over
others, which would violate the First Amendment if state action were involved (which isn’t the case here). Rather, this argument recommends
that section 230 doctrine incorporate laws and regulations that protect
against harms that worsen extant inequalities. It is in this vein that, in
recent years, scholars have written about the perils of the sweeping
protection under section 230. Mary Anne Franks, Danielle Citron,
Benjamin Wittes, and Ann Bartow in particular have described the ways
in which the current doctrine exposes young women, who are the likeliest victims of nonconsensual pornography, to greater injuries.148 I have
142. See, e.g., Goddard v. Google, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1201–02 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(“Plaintiff’s claims would treat Google as the publisher or speaker of third-party content.
Yet Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that plausibly would support a conclusion that Google
created or developed, in whole or in part, any of the allegedly fraudulent AdWords
advertisements.”).
143. See, e.g., Joshua Gillin, How Pizzagate Went from Fake News to a Real Problem for a
D.C. Business, PolitiFact (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/
2016/dec/05/how-pizzagate-went-fake-news-real-problem-dc-busin/ [https://perma.cc/W6UVG24V] (“Fake news became all too real over the weekend after a North Carolina man
entered a Washington pizzeria with an assault riﬂe in an attempt to ‘self-investigate’ a false
but persistent conspiracy theory about Hillary Clinton.”).
144. See, e.g., Kirsten Korosec, Elon Musk, SEC Agree to Guidelines on Twitter Use,
TechCrunch (Apr. 26, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/26/elon-musk-sec-agreeto-guidelines-on-twitter-use/ [https://perma.cc/3W6E-DB43] (discussing the agreement
between the SEC and Elon Musk to restrain Musk’s tweets about Tesla to avoid possible
securities fraud).
145. See Saﬁya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines
Reinforce Racism 1–14 (2018) (“The insights about sexist or racist biases that I convey
here are important because information organizations, from libraries to schools and
universities to governmental agencies, are increasingly reliant on or being displaced by a
variety of web-based ‘tools’ . . . .”).
146. Separately, I have written about the ways in which the blanket immunity has allowed Facebook and other platforms to develop products (for example, Facebook’s Ad
Manager) that analyze and sort harvested user data to generate classiﬁcations for advertisers that overtly violate civil rights laws in housing, employment, and credit markets and
then target and deliver such content to consumers on behalf of advertisers. Sylvain, Design
Duties, supra note 112, at 208–10.
147. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, To Err Is Platform, Knight First Amendment Inst.
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/err-platform [https://perma.cc/NZ6HCN4U].
148. Mary Anne Franks, The Cult of the Constitution 127–28 (2019) (arguing that
current First Amendment doctrine artiﬁcially entrenches inequality because it limits
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written, moreover, about the ways in which the doctrine should not be so
forgiving of platform designs that facilitate discrimination against historically subordinated or vulnerable users.149
Online content moderation, an aspect of Big Tech companies’
industrial design, should be treated for what it is: a managerial choice
about how these companies control and consolidate information ﬂows to
achieve their commercial objectives. But, today, the blanket immunity
has effectively given online platforms license to disregard expressive conduct that perpetuates or deepens harms for which policymakers have
drafted legal protections.150
V. WHEN LAW RULES, PLATFORMS WILL FOLLOW
Several developments of the past couple of years suggest that
meaningful reform of section 230 doctrine is afoot. In 2018, Congress
enacted exceptions to the immunity for intermediaries that knowingly
facilitate sex trafficking.151 Legislators acted in response to news about
online marketplaces and classiﬁeds (namely, Backpage.com) that had
been engaged in the practice.152 The statute’s wording is vulnerable to
constitutional challenge, but it demonstrates that legislators are prepared
today to narrow the protection under the statute in ways that did not
seem possible just ﬁve years ago.
Other recent opinions and litigation suggest that, looking forward,
platforms’ respective designs on user content and data may not remain as
immune from judicial scrutiny as they have been.153 The civil rights cases
regulation of nonconsensual pornography, which “disproportionately affect[s] women
and minorities”); Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1, 45 (2012)
(suggesting alterations in copyright law as a solution to the broad protections afforded by
section 230); Citron & Wittes, supra note 112, at 413–14 nn.94, 102 (“[T]he broad reading
of § 230 is why revenge porn operators have been so brazen about their business model.”).
149. Sylvain, Design Duties, supra note 112, at 54–55 (arguing that current invocations
of section 230 contradict congressional intent to protect vulnerable users); Sylvain,
Discriminatory Designs, supra note 141 (“[T]he current Section 230 doctrine . . .
foreclose[s] liability analysis for companies whose service designs routinely facilitate or
even encourage illicit content.”).
150. Citron and Wittes have proposed a sensible way of reforming the law. They
recommend a legislative amendment that would condition immunity on intermediaries’
exercise of a reasonable standard of care. Citron & Wittes, supra note 112, at 419.
151. See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L.
No. 115–164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (codiﬁed as amended in 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1591(e) (West
2018), 1595, 2421A, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e) (West 2018)).
152. Tom Jackman, House Passes Anti-Online Sex Trafficking Bill, Allows Targeting of
Websites like Backpage.com, Wash. Post (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/true-crime/wp/2018/02/27/house-passes-anti-online-sex-trafficking-bill-allowstargeting-of-websites-like-backpage-com/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
153. This Response does not address the European Union’s aggressive push under the
General Data Protection Directive against the extractive designs of “data controllers.” See
Anmar Frangoul, Data Protection in Europe Is About to Transform: Here’s How, CNBC
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/08/data-protection-in-europe-is-about-to-
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mentioned above against Facebook’s administration of its Ad Manager are
among them. Civil rights groups and aggrieved users filed five separate
lawsuits between late 2016 and 2018, in the wake of excellent reporting
by Julia Angwin and Terry Paris Jr. at ProPublica about “machine bias” in
Facebook’s advertising service.154 The cases ended in a settlement in
March 2019, just a few weeks after oral arguments in federal district
courts in New York and California, so there is not yet a full judicial opinion on point.155
Plaintiffs’ complaints generally alleged that Facebook had developed
unlawful content within the meaning of section 230 by creating suspect
classiﬁcations (such as racial “affinity” groups and age) that the company
would, in turn, present to advertisers as characteristics on which those
advertisers could ﬁnd prospective buyers.156 This allegation would be
enough, one would think, to raise eyebrows because civil rights laws ﬂatly
prohibit advertisements that hint at such classiﬁcations or proxies for
them.157 The complaints invoked some of the same logic on which the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a section 230 defense did not block the trial court’s consideration of dropdown menus
transform-heres-how.html [https://perma.cc/Z924-WBHK]. See generally Regulation
(EU) 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (limiting the processing and movement of personal
data by controllers). It is enough to mention here that, on July 29, 2019, the European
Court of Justice determined that Belgian data protection authorities were right to sanction
a fashion company that used the Facebook “like” plugin on its site because the company
became jointly responsible for the collection of user data. See Stephanie Bodoni,
Facebook’s Like Button Makes Websites Liable, Top EU Court Rules, Bloomberg (July 29,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-29/facebook-s-like-button-makeswebsites-liable-top-eu-court-rules (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
154. Julia Angwin & Terry Paris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race,
ProPublica (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisersexclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/TP9U-BNPN]; Kaya Yurieff, Facebook Settles Lawsuits
Alleging Discriminatory Ads, CNN (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/19/
tech/facebook-discriminatory-ads-settlement/index.html [https://perma.cc/S2PQ-NNWQ].
155. See Sheryl Sandberg, Doing More to Protect Against Discrimination in Housing,
Employment, and Credit Advising, Facebook Newsroom (Mar. 19, 2019), https://newsroom.
fb.com/news/2019/03/protecting-against-discrimination-in-ads/
[https://perma.cc/N5ZRB5WV]; Facebook Settlement, Nat’l Fair Hous. All., https://nationalfairhousing.org/
facebook-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/GRJ9-D73X] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). For the
settlement stipulations, see Stipulation and Order at 1, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook,
Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019); Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal at 2, Mobley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019);
Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 at 2, Riddick v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-04529-LB (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019). The other two cases were
disputes filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See ACLU,
Summary of Settlements Between Civil Rights Advocates and Facebook 2–3 (2019),
https://www.aclu.org/other/summary-settlements-between-civil-rights-advocates-andfacebook [https://perma.cc/JD4A-KHT8].
156. See Complaint ¶ 20, Mobley, No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD; Third Amended Class Action
Complaint ¶ 1, Riddick, No. 3:18-cv-04529-LB; Complaint ¶¶ 2, 4, Nat’l Fair Hous. All., No.
1:18-cv-02689 [hereinafter Nat’l Fair Hous. All. Complaint].
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f) (2012).
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on Roommates.com that elicited users’ gender, sexual orientation, and
family status, as well as their preferences for roommates on those
dimensions.158
Plaintiffs in the most recent cases alleged more, however. Among
other things, they argued that Facebook distributed advertisements to
“lookalike” demographic groups that its algorithms predicted would be
interested.159 That is, Facebook took steps to reach prospective buyers
and renters who were otherwise unknown or unavailable to advertisers in
order to better discriminate between buyers.160 The March 2019 settlement effectively ended all of this.161 And, while we will never know for
sure, it is reasonable to suspect that Facebook settled the case because,
quite unlike typical section 230 motions to dismiss that social media companies successfully ﬁle,162 this was a close call. The U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development ﬁled its own suit against Facebook days
after the company settled with the civil rights plaintiffs.163 It, too, is focused on the ways in which Facebook facilitates racial discrimination in
housing markets in the design of its Ad Manager.164 This suit makes
sense, since, no matter whether Facebook abides by the March 2019
settlement terms, their algorithms might still revert to discriminatory
advertisement distribution patterns.165 Anyway, the reviewing court might
very well have to entertain the section 230 defense anew and, this time,
reach a decision.
Other relatively recent cases that did reach judicial opinion are even
more suggestive that courts’ solicitude for online intermediaries under
section 230 doctrine is waning. This past summer, for example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Oberdorf v. Amazon rejected
158. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008).
159. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 156, ¶¶ 34–35, Riddick,
No. 3:18-cv-04529-LB.
160. See id. ¶¶ 38–39.
161. See Noam Scheiber & Mike Isaac, Facebook Halts Ad Targeting Cited in Bias
Complaints, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/technology/
facebook-discrimination-ads.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
162. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming
the dismissal of a section 230 claim against Facebook and its owner Mark Zuckerberg);
Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (granting Twitter’s motion to dismiss).
163. Ariana Tobin, HUD Sues Facebook over Housing Discrimination and Says the
Company’s Algorithms Have Made the Problem Worse, ProPublica (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/hud-sues-facebook-housing-discrimination-advertisingalgorithms [https://perma.cc/6RWX-ANZP].
164. Id.
165. Olivier Sylvain, Opinion, A Watchful Eye on Facebook’s Advertising Practices, N.Y.
Times (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/opinion/facebook-addiscrimination-race.html [https://perma.cc/6FQH-P4H4] (“[E]ven if Facebook substantially narrows the scope of targeting, there is no reason to believe that its algorithms might
not revert to discriminatory ad distribution patterns.”).
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Amazon’s section 230 defense to a product liability claim.166 Plaintiff, an
Amazon user who blamed the online retailer for a defective leash
manufactured by someone else, alleged that Amazon was not entitled to
the immunity because the injuries she suffered arose from Amazon’s actions as a seller, not as a publisher.167 The panel agreed, explaining that
Amazon “plays a large role in the actual sales process. This includes
receiving customer shipping information, processing customer payments,
relaying funds and information to third-party vendors, and collecting the
fees it charges for providing these services.”168 The panel remanded the
case to the lower court to identify the claims in plaintiff’s complaint that
alleged “actions or failures in the sales or distribution processes,” rather
than the editorial “failure to warn.”169 That is, plaintiff’s complaint would
survive Amazon’s motion to dismiss if the trial court ﬁnds that its allegations are addressed “to selling, inspecting, marketing, distributing, failing
to test, or designing.”170 Just weeks later, a federal trial court in the
Western District of Wisconsin cited the Third Circuit’s opinion to reject
Amazon’s section 230 defense in another strict liability claim under a
similar state law theory of product liability.171
The Amazon opinions align with an emergent line of cases, starting
with Barnes v. Yahoo, an opinion seemingly written for law school teaching, in which the court rejected a section 230 defense.172 This was another case involving an aggrieved ex-lover who created false and lurid
accounts of a former lover.173 Yahoo failed to take the material down after
hearing repeatedly from plaintiff.174 What is worse, on one occasion, it
failed to take down the material even after one of its representatives told
plaintiff that the company would do so.175 Plaintiff alleged two claims:
negligence for failure to block or take down the proﬁles, and promissory
estoppel for lulling plaintiff into thinking Yahoo would take the proﬁle

166. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 151 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that
some of plaintiff’s claims were barred by section 230).
167. Id. at 153 (discussing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)).
168. Id. This is to say nothing of the way in which Amazon assumes an even greater
role as a seller under its fulﬁllment service, not at issue in this Third Circuit case, where it
actually takes possession of the seller’s goods and manages the delivery. Id. at 141–42.
169. Id. at 153–54.
170. Id.; cf. Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016) (denying
preemption of duty to warn relating to defendant’s online practices).
171. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-cv-261-jdp, 2019 WL
3304887, at *7 (W.D. Wis. July 23, 2019) (“Courts that have considered whether the CDA
applies to strict liability claims against Amazon have held that it does not.”).
172. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009).
173. Id. at 1098 (“Barnes did not authorize her now former boyfriend to post the proﬁles, which . . . contained nude photographs . . . and some kind of open solicitation . . . to
engage in sexual intercourse.”).
174. Id. at 1098–99.
175. Id.
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down.176 The court rejected plaintiff’s ﬁrst claim on section 230 grounds,
holding that it was a defamation claim masquerading as a negligence
claim.177 But it rejected the motion to dismiss as to the second claim.178
Plaintiff’s alleged injury, the court explained, arose from Yahoo’s
promise that it would take the material down, which was an intervening
decision to “de-publish.”179
Courts have repeatedly cited the Barnes case to distinguish between
claims addressed to publishing and those arising from nonpublishing
events. The Tenth Circuit cited Barnes to reject a section 230 defense in
Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch.180 There, the defendant company
operated an elaborate business that provided paying consumers with the
private conﬁdential telephone records of anyone by actively enlisting
third-party researchers to ﬁnd such records in violation of privacy law.181
Similarly, in Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media, the Second
Circuit, citing Barnes, rejected the defendant’s section 230 defense because the defendant orchestrated the development of “fake news” on
sites across the web about weight loss products.182 The LeadClick Media
panel held that the section 230 defense did not apply because the FTC’s
allegations arose from the defendant’s deceptive actions as the manager
of an advertising network, not as a publisher.183 And, in Airbnb v. San
Francisco, the Northern District of California found that the city’s ordinance barring booking services for short-term rentals that are not registered with the city does not violate section 230 doctrine.184 Citing Barnes,
the court explained that the law imposes requirements that are unrelated
to Airbnb’s editorial decision about which units to make available to
guests.185
Barnes and its progeny have added important texture to section 230
doctrine. They, along with the Facebook Ad Manager settlements, are
also more than suggestive that the courts’ laissez-faire approach to platform moderation is not inevitable. Indeed, by the looks of it, judges’ earlier reticence may be giving way to serious but ordinary judicial scrutiny.
The systems and business designs that online companies develop and
operate are being seen for what they are: tools and techniques for
176. Id. at 1099.
177. Id. at 1105–06.
178. Id. at 1107–09.
179. Id.
180. 570 F.3d 1187, 1205 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 1206.
182. 838 F.3d 158, 177 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Accordingly, because LeadClick’s Section 5
liability is not derived from its status as a publisher or speaker, . . . Section 230 immunity
should not apply.”).
183. Id.
184. Airbnb, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1074 (N.D.
Cal. 2016).
185. Id. at 1072–73.
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advancing online companies’ own commercial mission, not a pristine
public-regarding exercise to promote “safe” or “healthy” conversations.
What would the world look like if section 230 doctrine were not the
obstacle to litigation that it has been for the past two decades? At a minimum, judges would be less likely to grant section 230 motions to dismiss
(or, as in Airbnb v. San Francisco, declaratory judgment claims brought
pursuant to that provision). This means more discovery which, in turn,
will give courts the occasion to scrutinize the ways in which platforms develop content review procedures and the incentives for doing so, as well
as the design and operation of screening technologies and the guidelines
that moderators must implement. In these, courts might ﬁnd evidence of
overt collaboration between platforms and “content developers.”186 Or
they might ﬁnd that platform managers set out to repurpose user information for their own commercial gain, at the expense of those very
users.187
Courts would probably also seriously consider the merits of any
given plaintiff’s legal claims and theories about causation and harm. That
is, they will draw on time-tested concepts of legal responsibility that the
prevailing section 230 doctrine has shut out of consideration. In such a
world, courts would no doubt begin to help reach an equilibrium between the industrial interest in innovation on the one hand and legal
protections for consumers and historically subordinated groups on the
other. The very notion that such interventions would be available is
surely worrying to the champions of unfettered internet freedom.188 But,
at least then, courts would begin to deliberate at trial and on appeal
about how far platforms may go in their designs on user-generated content and data.
We might learn, for example, that, to best protect consumers, online
platforms ought to consider the regulatory impacts of any update or new
service before its public release. Over the past couple of years, scholars
186. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2016)
(describing how Backpage provided a platform for online escort services to advertise
underage girls); see Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1191–92 (discussing the process by which
Accusearch collaborated with third-party researchers to provide conﬁdential telephone
records to paying customers).
187. See, e.g., Nat’l Fair Hous. All. Complaint, supra note 156, ¶ 122 (“Facebook excludes members of the public from access to housing advertising and information about
housing opportunities based on their sex, familial status, disability, race, national origin, or
other protected characteristics.”); cf. Adam Sternbergh, A Dystopian Cocktail, Served
Chilled with a Twist, N.Y. Times (July 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/
books/review/empty-hearts-julie-zeh.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing
Juli Zeh, Empty Hearts (2019), describing one character as “Britta, ‘a wife, mother and
successful businesswoman, [who] runs a start-up called, innocuously, The Bridge, which
algorithmically scours the internet in search of despondent people, then matches them up
with terrorist organizations to act as suicide bombers’” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Zeh, supra)).
188. See, e.g., supra notes 16–23 and accompanying text.
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and advocates have proposed, for example, “algorithmic impact assessments.”189 One such proposal, although addressed to the specific case of
government procurement of such systems (say, again, for pretrial
detention determinations or school placement), sets out procedures for
public notice and evaluation of any new system’s impact on different
communities.190 Other similar proposals recommend that government
administrators of automated decisionmaking systems explain the
processes that produce the system’s design, as well as its outcome.191
While, again, these proposals generally address government
administration of such systems, such an approach could also apply to
platforms in areas where courts and policymakers have already imposed
constitutionally valid limits on information ﬂow, including consumer
protection,192 civil rights,193 and securities law.194 In all of these
circumstances, courts would not refrain from scrutinizing the inner
workings—what I have been calling the “designs”—of the respective
services.
Critics might raise doubts about the courts’ institutional competence
to fully understand this dynamic line of business. But this challenge
would not be a new jurisprudential problem. To the contrary, this challenge really just revisits one of the most enduring questions about generalist judges deciding complex cases across substantive areas.195 In any
event, there are too many cases in the recent past that suggest the opposite.196 And, even if courts did not have the sophistication to understand
the speciﬁc workings of platform moderation tools and techniques, there
are institutional mechanisms and judicial doctrines to redress this chal-

189. See, e.g., Dillon Reisman, Jason Schultz, Kate Crawford & Meredith Whittaker,
AI Now Inst., Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical Framework for Public Agency
Accountability 4 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6AX9-Q78H]; Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1133–35 (2018).
190. Reisman et al., supra note 189, at 13–14.
191. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 189, at 1136–37.
192. See, e.g., FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2014).
193. See, e.g., Nat’l Fair Hous. All. Complaint, supra note 156, ¶ 123.
194. See, e.g., SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1222–23 (9th Cir. 2011).
195. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596
(2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (refusing to join
the majority opinion portions that went into ﬁne detail about molecular biology because
of his lack of expertise in the ﬁeld).
196. See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014); MGM Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919–20 (2005); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–53
(1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 627–29 (1994); MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220–21 (1994); NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
194 (1943); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763, 764–65 (D.C. Cir. 2008); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp.
131, 197–200 (D.D.C. 1982).
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lenge.197 If agencies start playing a greater role in taking on online platform moderation of content, without fear of blanket immunity, courts
would abide by longstanding deference norms in administrative law
doctrine.198
CONCLUSION
The big tech ﬁrms, policymakers, and courts are poised to reform
the ways in which to govern social media content. The proposed changes,
as varied as they are, will one way or another allocate responsibility between the stakeholders in new ways. This Response has argued, among
other things, that any such reforms should not treat social media applications as pristine speech platforms for earnest democratic debate. Rather,
in recognition of the work of many scholars, including Wu’s own impressive work, I assert that reform should address social media companies as
commercial enterprises whose priority is to maximize user attention and
engagement for advertisers. It is for this reason, I assert, that policymakers should reject efforts to defer to the companies’ own automated
decisionmaking systems for moderating content. These technologies are
just one asset in the political economy and industrial designs of social
media. They have not displaced the vital role that human labor and human incentives play. It is for this reason, I argue, that it is far too soon to
write off untested but extant resources in law.

197. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
198. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “History Belongs to the Winners”: The BazelonLeventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance Dichotomy in
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 995, 998 (2006) (“[A]n agency that
scrupulously observes fundamentally fair processes will receive a higher measure of deference from a reviewing court.”). That a growing faction on the current Supreme Court has
expressed some doubts about some deference doctrines does not recommend their
discontinuance.

